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Subject:  FUTURE  OF  THE  ECSC  TREATY 
1.  Pleaaons  for  current  reflect Ions  on  the  future  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty 
T h e  E  C  S  C  T r e a t y  e x  111  I r e s  I n  t h e  y e a r  2 0 0 2 ,  a s: p r o v I tie d  f o r  I n 
Article  87.  Although  It  still  has  twelve  years  to  run,  It· 
Is  not  too  early  to  discuss  Its  future,  for  the  following 
reasons: 
completion  of  the  single  market  and  moves  towards 
economic  and  monetary  union  place  the  continuation  of 
sectoral  policies,  Including  those  for  the  coal  and 
steel  Industries,  In  a  new  context  based  on 
considerations  of  overall  economic  policy.  It  should 
be  borne  In  mind  that  the  objectives  and  measures 
contained  In  the  ECSC  Treaty  were  formulated  at  the 
beginning  of  the  1950s,  In  other  words  against  an 
entirely  different  background. 
The  steel  and  coal  Industries 
Intensive  sectors.  Any  change 
adequate  preparation. 
are  highly 
therefore 
capital 
requires 
Moreover,  questions  have  been  raised  both  at  political 
level  (European  Parliament  and  Court  of  Auditors)  and 
by  certain  representatives  of  the  steel  Industry  about 
the  future  of  the  Treaty,  particularly  the,future  of 
the  Instruments  and  financial  role  of  the  ECSC  (levies, 
reserves  and  ECSC  loans)  and  of  certain  steel  policy 
measures  (forward  programmes,  general  objectives, 
pricing  policy,  etc.). 2 
11.  Possible  political  options 
The  future  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  can  be  approached  according  to 
numerous  different  scenarios  which  can,  however,  be  grouped 
Into  the  three  basic  options  following: 
1.  Maintaining  special  rules  for  the  coal  and  steel 
Industries  after  2002,  by  extending  the  ECSC  Treaty,  as 
It  stands  or  with  amendments. 
2.  Early  termination  of  the  ECSC  treaty  before  2002  and 
using  the  provisions  and  measures  In  the  EEC  Treaty  to 
cover  the  coal  and  steel  Industries. 
3.  Expiry  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  In  2002,  with  the 
understanding  that  by  that  t lme,  the  Commission  will 
examine  which  of  the· provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty 
could  be  Incorporated  In  the  EEC  Treaty. 
A  number  of  variants  could  be  added  to  this  option. 
Whilst  these  would  assume  the  expiry  of  the  ECSC  Treaty 
as  such  as  scheduled,  they  would  offer  at  the  same  time 
the  possibility  of  repealing  or  modifying,  before 
scheduled,  some  of  Its  obsolete  provisions  and/or 
Incorporating  Into  the  EEC  Treaty  others  deemed  useful 
or  necessary  for  the  whole  range  of  economic  activity. 
Ill.  Comparat lve  analysis  of  the  main  provisions  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty  and  of  the  EEC  Treaty 
*  The  Commission's  services  have  studied  In  detail  the  main 
chapters  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  In  order  to  assess  the 
different  above-mentioned  options.  The  analysis  has 
attempted  to  answer  the  following  four  quest Ions. 
<a> 
(b) 
What  Is  the  current 
measures  provided  for 
Could  the  EEC  Treaty 
measures  provided  for 
assessment  of  the  obJectives 
In  the  ECSC  Treaty? 
and 
be  used  to  achieve 
In  the  ECSC  Treaty? 
the  po II c y 
(c)  Would  It  be  worth  Incorporating  certain  specific 
provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  Into  the  EEC  Treaty? 
(d)  Is  It  necessary  to  revise  the  Implementation  and/or 
Interpretation  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  for  a  transitional 
period  from  now  until  Its  expiry  date? 
*The  main  results  of  the  an~lysls  .can  be  summarized  as 
f o I I ows. 
1.  The  aim  of  the~  (Article  49)  Is  twofold.  First,  It 
Is  designed  to  finance  certain  priority  measures  In  the 
sector  (non-repayable  redeployment  aid,  promoting 3 
research,  Industrial  redevelopment  of  areas  In  decline, 
etc.).  second,  It  Is  Intended  to  form  the  basis  for 
Independent  ECSC  financial  activities  as  provided  for 
In  tlie  Treaty,  without  the  need  to  call  on  public 
funds.  The  levy,  which  Is  the  sole  example  of  a 
genuine  Community  tax,  entails  direct  and  Indirect 
advantages  arising  out  of  the  financial  activities  made 
possible  by  the  use  of  the  resulting  funds,  which 
relate  to  the  market  and  to  public  Intervention. 
Within  the  margin  authorized  by  the  Treaty,  the 
Commission  has  exclusive  powers  to  fix  the  amount  of 
the  levy.  Theoretically,  It  would  be  possible  to 
reduce  the  levy  to  zero,  but  this  would  mean  a 
corresponding  reduction  In  the  capacity  of  the  ECSC  to 
generate  profits.  Nonetheless,  the  very  fact  that  the 
Commission  possesses  this  power  of  taxation  provides 
Important  guarantees.  In  practice,  the  amount  of  the 
levy  should  continue  to  be  fixed,  between  now  and  the 
year  2002,  on  the  bas Is  of  actua I  requIrements,  and 
with  an  eye  to  the  other  ECSC  resources  available. 
2.  After  the  year  2002,  It  would  be  desirable,  where 
3. 
budgets  and  finance  are  concerned,  to  retain  the 
following  features  of  the  ECSC  system  for  all  economic 
sectors: 
Articles  54  and  56:  If  necessary,  Increased 
financial  capacity  In  terms  of  loans  and  Interest-
rate  subsidies  In  order  to  enable  the  Commission  to 
mob I 1 lze  funds  for  regional  and  sectoral 
activities. 
This  matter  could  be  examined  beforehand  In  the 
context  of  the  work  on  economic  and  monetary  union. 
In  SEC(90)  1659  final  on  economic  and  monetary 
union,  the  Commission  points  to  the  need  to  adjust 
the  Communty  lending  Instruments  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  economic  union,  while  examining  the 
the  role  of  the  EIB. 
Article  55: 
exists,  of 
programmes. 
direct  management, 
major  technical  and 
as  It 
social 
already 
research 
Article  56:  joint  responsibility  as  regards  social 
assistance,  reflected  In  the  current  redeployment 
agreements  and  In  continued  scope  for  sectoral 
assistance  In  this  field. 
Current  ECSC 
ECSC  Is  In  a 
capital  at 
continue  to 
reserves  are  essential  to  ensure  that  the 
posIt I on  between  now  and  2002  to  mob I I I ze 
the  most  advantageous  rates  and  thus 
play  Its  role  In  the  Communlty<l>.The 
(1)  See  Information  report  on  ECSC  reserves 
(SEC(86)  1532  final). 4 
only  alternative  Is  for  all  ECSC  loans  to  be  covered, 
retroactively  If  necessary,  by  the  EEC  budget.  After 
2002,  the  question  of  guaranteeing  structural  loans 
granted  by  the  Commission  would  have  to  be  reexamined. 
4.  The  guidelines  on  production  (forward  programmes  and 
general  objectives)  and  capacity  (Articles  46  and  54) 
have  lost  much  of  the  Impact  that  they  had  when  the 
common  market  In  coal  and  steel  was  first  set  up.  The 
art lcles  referred  to  may  be  so  Interpreted  that  the 
Commission  may  decide  on  the  content  and  frequency  of 
these  guidelines.  It  would  seem  that  Implementation  of 
binding  Interventionist  measures  (Article  58)  wl I I  have 
to  be  ruled  out  because  of  the  Improvement  In  the 
competitiveness  of  undertakings  and  the  results, 
partially  negative,  of  the  production  quota  system. 
5.  The  price  rules- particularly  price  transparency  and 
non-discrimination- proved  Impracticable  from  the 
beginning.  Moreover,  these  rules  apparently  conflict 
with  the  rules  on  pricing  In  other  sectors  laid  down  by 
the  EEC  Treaty.  In  the  light  of  the  unforeseen 
difficulties encountered  In  practice  In  the  application 
of  Article  60  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  the  profound 
changes  In  the  economic  and  technical  conditions  which 
directly  affect  the  common  market  for  coal  and  steel, 
the  Commission  might  In  the  future  envisage  adapting 
the  rules  concerning  prices  and  the  exercise  of  the 
Commission's  powers  In  this  area.  Proposals  for 
suitable  modifications,  which  could  be  based  In  part  on 
Article  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  should  be  studied.  These 
proposals  would  also  cover  the  rules  for  transport 
tariffs. 
6.  The  ECSC  competition  rules  cover  agreements 
(Article  65)  and  concentrations  (Article  66).  In  the 
Interest  of  coherence  and  gIven  the  ex 1 stance  of  two 
distinct  treaties,  the  Commission  could  consider 
aligning,  as  far  as  possible,  the  treatment  of  ECSC  and 
EEC  products. 
The  application  of  Article  65  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  on 
agreements  between  undertakings  could  draw  on  the 
practices  developed  under  Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty, 
In  respect  of  both  the  material  law  and  the  procedural 
rules.  This  would  not,  however,  exclude  certain 
particularities  of  Article  65  ECSC,  notably  the 
possibility  It  offers  to  authorise  specialisation 
agreement,  JoInt  buyIng  or  se I I I ng  agreements  or 
strictly  analogous  agreement_s.  On  the.  ~ther  hand  In 
contrast  .to  Article  85  EEC,  an  effect  on  trade  between 
member  states  Is  not  a  precondition  for  the  application 
of  Article  66  ECSC. 5 
In  cases  where  at  least  one  of  the  undertakings 
concerned  Is  an  ECSC  undertaking  In  the  sense  of 
Article  80  ECSC  concentrations  are  dealt  with  under 
Article  66  ECSC  and  General  Decisions  concerning  Its 
appllcat lon.  Since  21  September  1990  when  Regulat ton 
4064/89/EEC  on  the  control  of  concentratIons  came  Into 
operation  the  Commission,  as  far  as  Is  possible, 
applies  the  competition  rules  of  the  two  Treaties  In  a 
similar  way,  particularly  when  the  transaction  Involves 
both  EEC  and  ECSC  products.  This  harmonisation  can 
also  be  achieved  by  an  Improvement  In  the  procedures 
for  notifying  ECSC  concentrations  and  by  the  Commission 
taking  Its  decision  on  the  concentration  In  question 
more  rapidly. 
However,  the  provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  governing 
competition  between  undertakings  differ  from  the 
corresponding  provisions  of  the  EEC  Treaty  on  one  basic 
point,  In  that  they  apply  exclusively.  In  other  words, 
when  It  comes  to  dealing  with  restrictive  practices  and 
concentrations  as  referred  to  In  the  ECSC  Treaty,  only 
the  provisions  of  that  Treaty  apply,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  provisions  of  national  law.  Under  the  terms  of 
the  EEC  Treaty,  on  the  other  hand,  undertakings  are 
subject  to  the  cumulative  application  of  Community  and 
national  law. 
7.  Control  of  State  aids  Is  more  restrictive  In  the 
ECSC  Treaty  than  In  the  EEC  Treaty,  In  that  the  former 
spells  out  the  derogations  which  are  permitted. 
Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  prohibits  State  aids  In 
principle.  Nevertheless,  Article  95  has  been  used  on 
several  occasions  to  grant  derogations  from  this 
express  ban,  relating  to  coa1<1)  and  steet<2>.  These 
codes  broadly  reflect  the  rules  applicable  to  the 
sectors  covered  by  Art lcles  92  and  93  of  the 
EEC  Treaty.  Moreover,  It  Is  clear  that  the  EEC  Treaty 
contains  no  equivalent  to  the  abovem~ntloned 
Article  4(c). 
A  further  binding  legal  framework  Is  provided  by  the 
bilateral  consensus  on  steel  concluded  with  the  United 
States,  which  covers  both  ECSC  and  certain  EEC  steel 
products  (OJ  L  368,  18.12.1989),  and  applies  until 
31  March  1992. 
Discussions 
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( 1)  CommIssIon  DecIsIon  2064/86/ECSC  of  30  June  1986  (OJ  L  177, 
1.7.1986},  applicable until  31  December  1993. 
(2)  Commission  Decision  322/89/ECSC  of  1  February  1989  (OJ  L  38, 
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a.  As  regards  social  measures,  the  ECSC  has  acquired 
Invaluable  experience  which  has  proved  Its  worth  on 
numerous  occasions  In  the  coal  and  steel  sectors.  The 
sharing  of  responsibility  for  financing  these  measures 
between  undertakings  and  the  Member  States,  In  the  form 
of  the  levy,  also  represents  a  form  of  solidarity 
between  the  public  and  private  sectors  which  Is  unique 
In  the  Community  context,  although  not  unknown  at 
national  level.  It  means  that  the  cost  of  financing 
these  measures  Is  shared  on  an  equitable  basis  between 
the  various  beneficiaries  which,  from  an  economic 
viewpoint,  represent  the  entire  sector  and  the  entire 
economy.  It  also  helps  ensure  that  the  measures  are 
applied  with  an  eye  to  efficiency  and  economy. 
These  features  could  be  useful  as  social  flanking 
measures  for  the  Community's  sectoral  policies  and 
possibly  also  for  the  policies  to  strengthen  economic 
and  social  cohesion.  However,  this  approach  would 
require  amendments  to  the  EEC  Treaty. 
9.  The  rules  on  commercial  policy  contained  In  the 
ECSC  Treaty  do  not  allow  a  genuine  common  policy.  At 
the  time,  competence  for  this  area  was  vested  In  the 
Member  States.  It  Is  true  that  In  practice  attempts 
have  been  made  to  assimilate  steel  and  coal  commercial 
policy  to  general  commercial  policy,  necessitating  two 
dIfferent  procedures.  As  a  resu It,  common  ru I es  are 
needed,  which  means  that  the  rules  In  the  Treaty  of 
Rome  have  to  be  applied  to  ECSC  products  In  order  to  do 
away  wIth  the  cumbersome  I ntergovernmenta 1  procedure 
which  applies  to  ECSC  products. 
10.  As  regards  Institutional  aspects,  the  ECSC  Treaty  gives 
the  Commission  much  greater  rule-making  powers  than  the 
Treaty  of  Rome,  together  with  full  executive  powers. 
In  the  EEC  Treaty,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Institutional 
rules  are  confined  In  the  most  part  to  establishing  the 
guiding  principles  according  to  which  Commmunlty  action 
must  be  taken,  without  laying  down  specific  rules, 
which  can  only  be  enacted  by  the  Councl 1  on  a  proposal 
from  the  Commission.  Applying  the  Institutional  rules 
In  the  EEC  Treaty  to  future  Community  action  In  the 
coal  and  steel  sectors  should  not  pose  any  maJor 
problems,  and  would  even,  In  some  cases,  be  more 
coherent  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  At  the 
same  time,  It  would  mean  relinquishing  a  significant 
part  of  the  Community's  Institutional  structure.  In 
particular,  It  would  mean  a  significant  weakening  of 
the  powers  to  penalize  Member  States  and  undertakings 
which  fall  to  fulfil  their  obligations. 7 
As  regards  Member  States  which  fa I I  to  fulfl I  their 
obligations,  the  Commission  has  the  power  to 
suspend  payment  of  the  sums  for  whIch  It  wou I d 
normally  be  liable  In  respect  of  the  Member  State 
In  question.  This  power  goes  wei I  beyond  the 
system  under  Art lcle  169  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  and 
consideration  has  already  been  given  to 
Incorporating  It  Into  the  EEC  Treaty. 
Where  undertakings  which  fall  to  fulfil  their 
obligations  are  concerned,  several  provisions  of 
the  ECSC  Treaty  authorize  the  Commission  to  Impose 
fines  on  undertakings  which  violate  the  decisions 
It  takes  pursuant  to  the  Treaty.  In  addition, 
Article  91  of  the  Treaty  states  that  If  an 
undertaking  does  not  pay  a  sum  due  to  the 
Commission,  the  latter  shall  be  entltlled  to 
suspend  payment  of  sums  due  to  that  undertaking,  up 
to  the  amount  of  the  outstanding  payment. 
Finally,  from  a  legal  standpoint,  the  ECSC  Treaty  In  some 
respects  provides  for  a  greater  level  of  Community  activity 
than  the  EEC  Treaty.  It  created  a  legislative  and 
administrative  Community  whose  principal  Institution,  the 
H I g h  Aut h or I t y ,  en J  o y e d  w I de-r an g I n g  man age  m.e n t  pow  e r s  I n 
the  sectors  concerned.  However,  even  In  the  areas  governed 
by  the  EEC  Treaty,  there  Is  a  trend  towards  a  gradual 
Increase  In  the  Commission's  administrative  management 
tasks. 
In  view  of  this  trend,  a  fundamental  question  arises  as  to 
whether  the  Commission,  given  the  arguments  In  favour  of 
maintaining  the  Community's  Institutional  structures,  should 
relinquish  the  management  powers  conferred  on  It  under 
primary  legislation. 
IV.  Assessment  of  the  various  options 
This  assessment  results  from  the  examination  of  the  legal 
and  political  consequences  of  the  different  options. 
1.  *  Option 1- maintaining  rules  specific  to  coal  and  steel 
after  2002  -may  have  a  number  of  advantages,  Including: 
continued  recognition  of  the  special  nature  of  the  two 
Industries  and  the  special  relationships  their 
representatives  enjoy  with  the  Commission; 
more  favourable  social  provisions  for  workers  than  In 
the  sectors  covered  by  the  EEC  Treaty; 
In  the  case  of  the  steel  Industry;  stricter  rules  on 
State  aid  and  the  possibility  of  direct  Commission 
Intervention  In  the  event  of  a  serious  economic  crisis; 8 
In  addition  to  these  arguments  put  forward  by  the 
representatives  of  the  two  Industries,  the  Commission  has 
greater  powers  under  the  ECSC  Treaty,  as  has  been  recalled 
In  point  111.10  above,  and  enjoys  financial  autonomy  In 
respect  of  borrowing  and  lending  which  It  does  not  have 
directly  under  the  EEC  Treaty. 
*On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  arguments  against 
Opt I on  1 . 
The  coal  and  steel  Industries  are  no  longer  special 
cases  In  the  way  that  they  were  In  the  post-war  years. 
Other  sectors  of  the  economy  are  similar  In  many 
respects  and  operate  on  an  eQually  large  scale  In  the 
Community,  particularly  seen  In  the  context  of  the 
single  market  and  the  work  In  progress  to  achieve 
economic  and  monetary  union. 
The  comparat Iva  study  of  the  ECSC  and  EEC  Treat les 
summarized  In  point  111  above  shows  that  most  of  the 
provisions  and  measures  deriving  from  the  ECSC  Treaty 
can  be  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  In 
particular  by  Invoking  Article  235,  the  eQuivalent  of 
Article  95  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  which  has  already  been 
used  for  derogations  from  Its  excessively  stringent 
provisions,  e.g.  those  on  State  aids.  However,  using 
the  EEC  Treaty  as  a  legal  base  presupposes  unanimity 
within  the  Council,  and  could  prove  a  drawback  for  the 
pursuit  of  certain  policies,  such  as  providing  the 
Community  with  autonomous  financial  powers. 
This  option  would  reQuire  politically  complex 
procedures  necessitating  Council  unanimity  and 
ratification  by  the  twelve  Parliaments  (see  Article  96 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  Article  236  of  the  EEC  Treaty). 
2.  *  Early  termination  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  - Option  2  - has  a 
number  of  advantages. 
It  would  put  an  end  to  the  special  treatment 
being  reQuested  by  representat lves  of  the 
s t  I  I  I 
two 
Industries,  for  which  there  Is  no  longer  any 
Justification.  Coal  and  steel  are  no  longer  key 
Industries,  nor  are  they  now  the  only  Industries 
susceptible  to  cyclical  change.  As  a  result,  there  will 
no  longer  be  any  grounds  for  making  special 
arrangements  for  these  Industries  once  the  single 
market  has  been  completed. 
It  would  be  a  way  of  no  longer  having  to  apply  some  of 
the  obsolete  provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
particularly  those  on  the  organization  of  production 
(Article  58)  and  pricing  policy  (Article  60). 9 
It  would  make  It  possible  to  speed  up  application  of 
the  common  commercial  policy  provided  for  In  the  EEC 
Treaty. 
>C<There  Is,  however,  an  Important  obstacle  to  this  option  as 
It  Is  not  at  all  certain  that  It  would  be  possible  to  obtain 
unanimous  acceptance  by  the  Councl I  and  ratification  by  the 
twelve  Parliaments,  which,  according  to  Article  96  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty,  would  be  reQuired  to  Implement  this  option,  If 
It  were  reJected  by  the  representatives  of  the 
socio-economic  categories  concerned. 
3.  *Expiry  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  In  2002  as  scheduled- Option  3-
has  the  following  advantages  : 
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  this  option  would 
reaffirm  the  legal  framework  for  the  coal  and  steel 
Industries  until  2002,  while  at  the  same  time  allowing 
a  sufficiently  long  transitional  period  to  prepare  for 
Inclusion  In  the  EEC  Treaty  after  2002. 
It  should  be  borne  In  mind  that  there  will  be  a 
widespread  need  for  Industrial  redevelopment  In  the 
coal-mining  areas  In  the  years  ahead,  as  the 
application  of  the  RECHAR  programme  shows,  and  given 
the  planned  closure  of  numerous  coal  mines.  Moreover, 
It  would  be  premature  to  state  at  this  stage  that  the 
prob I ems  of  a I I  the  stee 1-produc I ng  regIons  have  been 
overcome  once  and  for  all.  In  addition,  account  will 
have  to  be  taken  of  the  problems  of  the  coal  and  steel 
Industry  In  the  new  German  Lander.  These  factors  are 
further  arguments  for  maintaining  the  budgetary  and 
financial  Instruments  specific  to  the  ECSC  to  cover 
social  and  regional  action  up  to  2002,  bearing  In  mind 
that  necessary  action  after  that  date  would  be  covered 
by  EEC  Treaty  Instruments  and  appropriate  financial 
means  wl I I  have  to  be  provided. 
This  transitional  period  would  also  enable  the 
Commission  gradually  to  modify  Interpretation  and 
Implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
and,  where  necessary,  of  certain  provisions  of  the  EEC 
Treaty  with  a  view  to  Including  the  two  sectors  In  the 
EEC  Treaty  after  2002.  These  gradual  changes  have 
a I ready  begun  In  sever a I  areas,  e.g.  the  content  of  the 
forward  programmes  for  stee I,  stee I  commerc 1  a 1  po 1 1  cy 
and  rules  on  State  aids  In  the  two  sectors. 
*  It  would  be  desirable  for  a  number  of  variants  to  be  added 
to  option  3: 
a.  the  replacement  of  certain  obsolete  provisions  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty  by  those  In  the  EEC  Treaty  covering  the 
same  fields.  This  applies  In  particular  to  the  price 
rules  (Article  60)  and  the  provisions  relating  to 
commercial  policy  (Articles  71-75)  kn  the  ECSC  Treaty; 10 
b.  the  Incorporation  Into  the  EEC  Treaty,  between  now  and 
2002,  of  certain  provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  deemed 
useful  or  necessary  for  the  whole  range  of  economic 
activity; 
c.  In  line  with  the  considerations  set  out  In  Its 
communication  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (SEC(90) 
1659  final),  the  Commission  will  carry  out  a  parallel 
study  on  the  evolution  of  the  Community's  financial 
Instruments  from  the  point  of  view  of  meeting  the  needs 
of  EconomIc  and  Monetary  UnIon.  ThIs  I ncr eased 
financial  role  Is  necessary  In  view  of  reinforcing 
economic  convergence,  Including  economic  and  social 
cohesion,  and,  In  general  terms,  the  balanced  evolution 
of  european  Integration. 
As  each  of  these  variants  Implies  a  revision  of  the  Treaty, 
the  application  of  the  parliamentary  ratification  procedure 
In  the  12  Member  States  would  of  course  be  necessary. 
V.  Cone I us I on 
In  view  of  the  foregoing,  the  Commission  has  decided  to: 
1.  Adopt,  as  Its  political  position,  the  general  option  which 
provides  for  the  ECSC  Treaty  to  expire  as  scheduled  In  2002, 
taking  advantage  of  the  flexlbl I lty  which  that  Treaty 
provides  In  order  to  modify  Its  application,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  the  two  Industries  so  that  they  are  gradually 
taken  over  by  the  EEC  Treaty  In  2002; 
2.  between  now  and  2002,  add,  when  appropriate,  to  this  option 
the  Incorporation  Into  the  EEC  Treaty  of  certain  provisions 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  Including  the  maintenance  of  such 
financial  Instruments  and  social  provisions  as  may  be  deemed 
useful  or  necessary; 
3.  In  case  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  being  amended  before  the  period 
preceding  Its  expiry,  and  Independently  of  points  1  and  2 
above,  to  rescind  the  provisions  relative  to  the  price  rules 
(Article  60)  and  to  commercial  policy  (Articles  71-75),  on 
the  understanding  that  these  subjects  will  then  be  covered 
automatically  by  the  EEC  Treaty; 
4.  In  parallel,  to  rapidly  complete  the  study  of 
of  the  Community's  financial  Instruments  from 
view  of  contributing  to  the  setting  up  of 
Monetary  Union. 
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